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The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
David (elth HOOD, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Cr. 13651. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Dec. 18, 1969. 
Defendant was convicted in . the Su-
perior Court, Napa County, F. Leslie Man-
ker, J., assigned by the Chairman of the 
. Judicial Council, of assault with a deadly 
weapon upon a police officer and assault 
with intent to murder officer, and he ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Traynor, C. 
J., held that evidence of defendant's intoxi-
cation should not be considered in deter-
mining whether he committed assault with 
a deadly weapon on a police officer or any 
of lesser assaults included therein. 
Reversed. 
Opinion, Cat.App., 78 Cal.Rptr. 1, va-
cated. 
I. Criminal Law cg::::,S24(4) 
Trial ~ourt must instruct the jury on 
general principles of law relevant to issues 
raised by evidence, even though not re-
quested to do so, but need not instruct on 
its own motion on specific points developed 
at the trial. 
2. Criminal Law cg::::,S24(3) 
Where instruction on lesser included 
offenses would be supported by evidence 
but is not requested, failure of court to give 
such an instruction on its own motion is 
error; overruling People v. Bailey, 142 Cal. 
434, 76 P. 49; People v. Hite, 135 Cal. 76, 
67 P. 57; People v. Franklin, 70 Cal. 641, 
11 P. 797; People v. Smith, 223 Cal.App. 
2d 225, 35 Cal. Rptr. 719; People v. Cald-
eron, 155 Ca1.App.2d 526, 318 P.2d 498; and 
People v. Williams, 141 Ca1.App.2d 849, 297 
P.2d 759. 
3. Criminal Law cg::::,S24(3) 
Where evidence in prosecution for as-
sault with a deadly weapon upon a peace 
officer was suffiCient ,to raise question 
whether officer had become angered and 
ceased to become engaged in performance 
of his'duties or whether defendant could 
rea'sonably nave so believed, it was error 
fo; co'urt to' fail to instruct on lesser in-
du'ded offense 0f assault with a deadly 
weapon on its own motion. 
4. Assault and Battery cg::::,85 
Evidence of defendant's intoxication 
should not be considered in determining 
whether he cOn1mitted assault with a deadly 
weapon' on a police officer or any of lesser 
assaults included' therein; disapproving 
People v. Fanning, 265 Ca1.App.2d 729, 71 
Ca1.Rptr. 641. West's Ann.Pen.Code, §§ 
242, 243, 245 (b) . 
• 
Kelvin L. Taylor, Palo Alto, under ap-
pointment by the Supreme Court, for de-
fendant and appellant:' 
. Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Robert R. 
Granucci, John T. Murphy and Jerome C. 
Utz, Deputy Atty.' Gens., for plaintiff 
indre~pondent. 
TRAYNOR, Chief Justice. 
.An indictment charged defendant in 
Cpunt I with assault with a deadly weapon 
upon a peace officer, Alfred Elia (Pen. 
~ode, § 245, subd. (b», in Count II with 
battery upon a peace officer, Donald Kem-
per (Pen.Code, §§ 242, 243), and in Count 
III with assault with intent to murder Of-
. ficer Ella (Pen. Code, § 217). A jury found 
him guilty on Counts I and III and not 
guilty on Count II, and' the trial court en-
tered judgment on the verdicts. The trial 
collrt also ordered that "Defendant shall 
serve the sentence in Count Three only 
* * * as th~ sentence in Count One 
* '* . * is withheld arid wilt only be im-
posed if the sentence for Count Three. is 
not cat-ried Qut for any reason. * * *" 
Defendant appeals. 
On September 11, 1967, at about 2 ;00 a. 
m., defendant, his brother Donald, and a 
friend, Leo Chilton, all of whom had been 
drinking for several hours, knocked on the 
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door of the house of Susan Bueno, defend- fendant swung at him with his fist. When 
ant's former girlfriend, and asked if they Officer Kemper attempted to go to Officer 
could use the bathroom. Susan said no, Elia's assistance, Donald Hood jumped on 
but defendant forced his way in and started him from behind. During the ensuing 
to hit her. He knocked her to the floor and struggle, Officer Elia fell with defendant 
kicked her. Donald Hood then took Susan on top of him in a corner of a pantry ad-
aside, and defendant, Chilton, and Gene joining the kitchen at the rear. While 
Saunders, a friend of Susan's who was struggling on the floor, Officer Elia felt 
staying at the house, went to the kitchen a tug at his gun belt and then heard two 
and sat down. shots fired. 
Gilbert A. Nielsen, Sus~n's next-door 
neighbor, was awakened by the sound of 
Susan's screams and called the police. 9f-
ficers Elia and Kemper responded to. his 
call. After talking to Nielsen, they went 
to Susan's house, knocked on the door, 
which was opened by Stella Gonzales, Su-
san's cousin, and asked if "Susie" was 
there. Miss Gonzales said, "Yes, just a 
minute," and in a few seconds Susan came 
running to the door crying. Officer EIia 
asked Susan if she had been beaten and 
who did it. She pointed to the kitchen and 
said, "They're in there right now." The 
two officers walked through the living 
room, where Susan, Susan's seven-year-old 
son Ronnie, and Stella remained, and went 
into the kitchen. There they observed de-
fendant on the right-hand side of the room 
leaning against a door. On the left side of 
the kitchen, the three other men were 
seated at a table. Officer Elia walked to 
the middle of the room and qt1estioned the 
men at the table. Defendant interrupted 
the questioning and asked Officer Elia if he 
had a search warrant. Officer Elia replied 
that he did not need one since the person 
who rented the house had given him per-
mission to enter. Defendant then directed 
a stream of obscenities at Officer Elia, 
who tt1rned and, according to his testimony, 
started to place defendant under arrest for 
a violation of Penal Code section 415 (using 
vulgar, profane, or indecent language with-
in the presence or hearing of women or 
children). He got no further than to say, 
"Okay fella, you are * * *," when de-
t. "Every person who commits lili assault 
upon the person of another with a deadly 
weapon or instrument or by any means 
A third officer, Laurence Crocker, who 
had arrived at the house shortly after the 
other two officers, came into the kitchen as 
the scuffle between Officer Elia and de-
fendant was beginning. After he had con-
trol of Donald Hood: he looked across the 
kitchen. and saw defendant with a gun in 
his right hand. He testified that defendant 
pointed the. gun towards Officer Elia's. mid-
section and pulled the trigger. twice. 
Both Officers Crocker and Kemper testi-
fied that after the shots, defendant's arm 
came up over his head with the revolver 
in his hand. The struggle continued into 
the. bathroom. Defendant was finally sub-
dued when Officer Elia regained possession 
of the gun and held it against the side of 
defendant's neck. Officer Elia then noticed 
that defendant had shot him once in each 
leg~ 
The foregoing evidence is clearly- suf-
ficient to stlpport the verdicts. 
Defendant contends that the court failed 
properly to instruct the jury with respect 
to lesser included offenses to the offense 
charged in Count I, and that it also erred in 
instructing on the effect of intoxication 
with respect to the offenses charged in 
both Counts 1 and III. 
The court instr·ucted that "The offense 
of assault with a deadly weapon, with 
which defendant * * * is charged in 
Count One of the indictment necessarily in-
cludes the lesser offense of assault." This 
instruction incorrectly referred to the crime 
charged merely as assault with a deadly 
weapon (Pen.Code, § 245, subd. (a» 1 in-
of force likely to Produce great bodily 
injury is punishable * * *." 
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stead of assault with a deadly weapon upon 
a peace officer (Pen.Code, § 245 .. subd. 
(b)).2 It thus served to blur the distinc-
tions between these two offenses. More-
over, the court did not instruct the jury 
that assault with a deadly weapon upon a 
peace officer includes the lessser offenses 
of assault with a deadly weapon as well as 
simple assault, or that the jury could con-
vict defendant of no more than assault with 
a deadly weapon, if it found that Officer 
Elia was not engaged in the performance 
of his duties or that defendant neither 
knew nor reasonably should have known 
that he was so engaged. As instructed, the 
jury could only convict defendant of simple 
assault or assault with a deadly weapon 
upon a peace officer. Defendant, however, 
did not request an instruction that he could 
be found guilty of the lesser offense of as-
sault with a deadly weapon. Accordingly, 
the question presented is whether the court 
erred in failing to give stich an instruction 
on its own motion. 
[1] The general rule is that the trial 
court must instruct the jury on the general 
principles of law relevant to the issues 
raised by the evidence, even though not 
requested to do so, but need not instruct on 
its own motion on specific points developed 
at the trial. (People v. Wilson (1967) 66 
Ca1.2d 749, 759, 59 Cal. Rptr, 156, 427 P,2d 
820; People v. Jackson (1963) 59 CaL2d 
375, 380, 29 Cal.Rptr, 50S, 379 P.2d 937; 
People v. Bevins (1960) 54 Cal.2d 71, 77, 
4 Cal.Rptr. 504, 351 P.2d 776; People v. 
Wade (1959) 53 Cal.2d 322,334, 1 Cal.Rptr. 
683,348 P.2d 116; People v. Putnam (1942) 
20 Cal.2d 885, 890, 129 P.2d 367; People 
v. Warren (1940) 16 Ca1.2d 103, 116-117, 
104 P.2d 1024. See People v. Martin (1919) 
44 Ca1.App, 45, 185 P. 1003; People v. 
Stirgios (1913) 23 Cal.App. 48, 136 P. 
957; People v. Rogers (1912) 163 Cal. 476, 
484, 126 P. 143 (first statement of the rule 
2. "Every person who commits nn nssnult 
with a deadly wenpon or instrument or 
by any menns likely to produce grent 
bodily injury upon the person of a pence 
officer or fireman, and who knows or 
reasonably should know thnt such victim. 
in substantially its present form); People 
v. Olsen (1889) 80 Cal. 122, 128--129, 22 p, 
125 (rule implied in dictum).) In People 
v. Wade, supra, we pointed out that the 
"general principles of law governing the 
case" are "those principles of law com-
monly or closely arid openly connected with 
the facts of the case before the court." As 
we indicated in Wade, the rule is designed 
to afford protection against the inad-
vertence of trial counsel. 
[2] As the Court of Appeal noted in 
People v. Cooper (1968) 268 A.CA. 12, 
14-19, 73 Cal.Rptr. 608, the cases estab-
lishing this general rule are in conflict 
with another line of cases that hold that 
it is not error for the court to fail to in-
struct on lesser included offenses on its 
own motion, even though such an instruc-
tion would be supported by the evidence. 
(People v. Bailey (1904) 142. Cal. 434, 76 
P.49; People v, Rite (1901) 135 Cal. 76, 
67 P. 57; People v. Franklin (1886) 70 
Cal. 641, II P. 797; People v. Smith (1963) 
223 CaJ.App.2d 225, 237, 35 Ca1.Rptr. 719; 
Peoplev. Calderon (1957) 155 Ca1.App.2d 
526, 530, 318 P.2d 498; People v. Williams 
(1956) 141 Ca1.App.2d '849, 853, 297 P.2d 
759,) We believe that there is no basis 
for such an exception to the general rule. 
Accordingly, to the extent that the fore-
going cases support a special rule. for 
lesser included offenses, they are overruled. 
We must therefore determine whether 
the distinction between assault with a dead-
ly weapon upon a peace officer and assault 
with a deadly weapon is a principle of 
law "commonly or closely and openly con-
nected with the facts of the case before 
the court" (People v. Wade, supra), and 
whether the evidence in this case clearly 
indicated that Officer Elia might not have 
been engaged in the performance of his 
duties or that defendant might not have 
is a pence officer or fireman engaged in 
the performance of his duties, when such 
peace officer or fireman is engaged in 
tlie p'eri~rmance of his duties shall be 
punished '" .. "'." 
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known or had reason to know that he was 1y and clearly inform his adversary of his 
so engaged. 
[3] The officers were in uniform and 
defendant had reason to know the,y were 
lawfully present in the house to investigate 
a disturbance. If there was no evidence 
that Officer Elia exceeded the scope of 
his duties the distinction between the two 
offenses ~ould not be a sigQificant issue. 
There was stIch evidence, however. De-
fendant testified that as Officer Elia turned 
and came toward him, he thought the of-
ficer was drawing his gun and was going 
to shoot him. This evidence was sufficient 
to raise the question whether Officer Elia 
had become angered and ceased to be en-
gaged in the performance of his duties" 
or whether defendant could reasonably 
have so believed. Indeed, it was this very 
evidence that raised the issue of self-de-
fense, on which the court instructed fully. 
Thus, the issue whether the officer exceed-
ed the scope of his duties, or whether de-
fendant reasonably believed he had, was 
"closely and openly connected with the 
facts" before the court, and it was therefore 
error for the court to fail to instruct on the 
lesser included offense of assault with a 
deadly weapon. Moreover, that error was 
prejudicial, for it deprived defendant of 
his constitutional right to have the jmy 
determine every material issue presented 
by the evidence. (Peopk v. Graham (1969) 
71 A.C. 320,327, 78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455 
P.2d 153; People v. Mosher (1969). 1 Cal. 
3d 379. 389, 390, 82 Ca1.Rptr .. )79, 385-.1R6, 
./61 1'.2<1659, 665-666.) 
There is no merit in the contention that 
in rejecting the defense of self-defense the 
jury must have rejected the evidence that 
Officer Elia exceeded the scope of his 
duties. The court instructed the jury that 
"Where a person seeks or induces a quarrel 
which leads to the necessity in his own 
defense of using force against his adver-
sary, the right to stand his grottnd and thus 
defend himself is not immediately avail-
able to him, but, instead he must first de-
cline to carryon the affray, must honestly 
endeavor to escape from it, and must fair-
desire for peace and of his abandonment 
of the contest. Only when he has done 
so will the law justify him in thereafter 
standing his ground and using force upon 
his antagonist." The court also instructed 
the jury that "If an assault with the fists 
is being made on a person, but without in-
tent to kill or to do great bodily harm, and 
if the assault is not likely to produce great 
bodily injury, and if the one thus attacked 
is not deceived as to the character of such 
an assault, he is not justified in using a 
deadly weapon in self defense." The jury 
could have rejected the defense of self-
defense under either of these instructions 
without reaching the question whether Of-
ficer EIia exceeded the scope of his duties 
by initiating an assault upon defendant, or 
the question whether defendant reasonably 
so believed. Under the first instruction 
the jury could have found that defendant 
sought or induced a quarrel by the stream 
of obscenities directed at Officer Elia and 
thereafter failed to seek to withdraw from 
the fray, thus forfeiting his right to defend 
himself. Under the second instruction the 
jury could have found that at the time de-
fendant seized the gt1n, he should have 
realized that the officer's assault upon him 
did not justify the use of a deadly weapon. 
Under either of these hypotheses, defendant 
could still be not guilty of assault with a 
deadly weapon upon a peace officer within 
the meaning of subdivision (b) of section 
245 if Officer Elia exceeded the scope of 
his duties by responding to defendant's in-
sults with excessive force, or if defendant 
reasonably so believed. (People v. Curtis 
(1969) 70 A.G. 360, 370 n. 9, 74 Ca1.Rptr. 
713, 450 P.2d 33.) '''Ie note in fairness to 
the trial court that its failure so to in-
struct the jury was justified at that time 
by such decisions as People v. Baca (1966) 
247 Ca1.App.2d 487, 495, 55 Cal.Rptr. 681 
(subsequently disapproved in People v. Cur-
tis, supra, p. 368 n. 6, 74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 
450 P.2d 33). 
The judgment must also be reversed as to 
Count III, for the court gave hopelessly 
conflicting instructions on the effect of in-
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toxication.3 Although the court correctly 
instructed the jury to consider the evidence 
that defendant was intoxicated in determin-
ing whether he had the specific intent to 
commit murder, it followed that instruc-
tion with the complete text of CAL]IC No. 
78 (revised), which applies to crimes that 
require proof only of a general criminal 
intent. The court in no way made clear 
to the jury that the latter. instruction did 
not apply to the charge of assault with 
intent to commit murder. The gi~ing of 
such conflicting instructions with respect to 
a crime requiring proof of a specific in-
tent is error (People v. Spencer (1963) 60 
Cal.2d 64, 87, 31 Cal,Rptr. 782, 383 P.2d 
134; People ~. F~rd (1964) 60 Cal2d 
772, 796, 36 dl.Rptr. 620; 388 P.2d 892; 
People. v. Arriola (1958).164 Ca1.App.2d 
430, 434,.435, 330 P.2d 683). That error 
was clearly p~ejudicial in this case.. There 
was substantial evidence that defendant was 
3, The' court instructed: 
"To constitute the crime of !lssault 
with intent to commit murder there must 
exist an assault and, in the mind of the 
perpetrator, a specific. 'preconceived in. 
tent to kill a human being. 
"In a crime such as that of which 
. defendant, DAVID KEITH HOOD, is 
charged in Count Three of the indict-
ment, there must exist a union or joint' 
operation of act or' conduct and a cer· 
tain. spocific intent. . 
"In the crime of Assault With Intent 
to Commit Murder (Penal Co(le Section 
217), there .must exist in the mind of 
the' perpetrator the specific intent to 
. murder a human being, and unless such 
intent so exists that crime is not com-
mitted. 
"In' the crime of assault with intent 
to commit murder of which the defend-. 
ant, DAVID HOOD, is accused in count 
III of the indictment, a necessary ele-. 
mont is the existence in the mind of the 
defendant of the specific intent to com-
mit murder. 
"If the evidence shows" that the de· 
fendantwas intoxicated at the' time of 
the alleged offense, the jury should con· 
sider his state of intoxication in deter-
mining if defendant had such specific in-
tent. 
"Intoxication of a person is voluntary 
if it results from his willing partaking 
of any intoxic~ting liquor, drug or other 
substance wheil. he knows that it is eapa· 
drunk. He testified that he was not aware 
that he ever had the gun in his possession 
or fired it. Its discharge during the scuffle 
could be reconciled with an intent to kill, 
an intent to inflict only bodily injury, or 
with no intent to fire it at all. Had the 
jury not been given conflicting instructions 
on the significance of defendant's intoxi-
cation, it is reasonably probable that it 
would have reached a result more favorable 
to defendant on Count III. (People v. 
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 
P.2d 243.) 
To guide the trial court on retrial, we 
consider the question of the effect of in-
toxication on the crime of assault with a 
deadly weapon. 
Many cases have held that neither assault 
with a deadly weapon nor simple assault is 
a speci fic intent crime:' A number of these 
ble of an intoxicating effect or when he 
willingly assumes the risk of that effect 
as a possi bility. 
"Our law provides that' 'no act eom· 
mitted by a person while in a state of 
voluntary intoxication is less criminal by 
reason of !lis having bc<!n in such· con· 
dition.' 
"This means that drunkenness, if the 
evidence shows that the defendant was 
in such a condition when allegedly he 
committed the (a)· crime .charged, is not 
of itself a defense in this case. It may 
throw light on the occurrence and aid 
you in determitling what took place, but 
wluin a person in a state of intoxication, 
voluntarily produced by himself, commits 
a crime such as that (any of those) 
charged against the defendant in this 
Case, the law does not permit him to use 
his own vice as a shelter against the 
normal legal consequences of his con· 
duct." 
4. People v. McMakin (1857). 8 Cal. 547, 
548; People v. Marseiler (1886) 70 Cal. 
98, 11 P.503; People v. Franklin 
(1886) 70 Cal. 641, 11 P. 797; People 
v. Leyba (1887) 74 Cat 407, 409, 16 
P. 200; People v. Wells (1904) 145 Cal. 
138, 140, 78 P. 470; People v. McCoy 
(1944) 25 Cal.2d 177, 194, 153 P.2d 315; 
People v. Sanchez (1950), 35 CaI.2d 522, 
526-528, 219 P.2d 9; People v. Price 
(1908).9 Cal.App. 218, 221, 98 P. 547; 
People v. Stephens (1916) 29 Cal.App. 
616, 622, 157 P. "570 (opinion of Supreme 
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cases held that an assault with a deadly 
weapon could be predicated on reckless, as 
well as intentional, conduct. "'Where the 
act is both unlawful and wrongful, and well 
calculated to inflict serious personal injury, 
the law will imply malice, and an unlawfl.!l 
intention and override any actual intention 
existing in the mind of the aggressor. 
Thus, while it is not an assault to fire 
a gun in the air for the purpose' of frighten-
ing another, it is an assault, without regard 
to the aggressor's intention, to fire a gun 
at another or in the direction in which 
he is standing .. The law will not tolerate 
stich a reckless disregard for human life.''' 
(People v. Peak, supra, 66 Ca1.App.2d 89~, 
901, 153 P.2d 464, 467, quoting from 4 Am. 
Jur., § 6, p. 130.) "[Pen.Code § 245J 
provides that 'Every person who co"mmits 
an assault· * * * with a deadly weapon 
or instrument or by any means or force 
likely to produce great bodily injury/ .is 
guilty of that offense. The intention to 
actually injure another is not mentioned in 
that section. * * * If a rifle is delibe't-
defendant does not really intend to hit the 
victim." (People v. Corlett, supra, 67 Cal. 
App.2d 33, 54-55, 153 P.2d 595, 605.) (See 
also People v. Vasquez (1927) 85 Cal.App. 
575,259 P. 1005.) 
The first clear signs of doubt that an 
assault with a deadly weapon was not a 
specific intent crime are found in People 
v. Carmen (1951) 36 Ca1.2d 768, 228 P.2d 
281. The defendant was convicted of first 
degree murder and assault with intent to 
murder. As to the murder charge, he con-
tended that he stumbled as he approached 
the car in which his victim was sitting and 
that the gun was discharged accidentally. 
The trial court refused to give an instruc-
tion on manslaughter, although requested 
to do so by both parties. In reversing the 
murder conviction, this court stated (p. 775, 
228 P.2d p. 286) : 
"If the act committed by defendant was 
unlawful but did not amount to a felony 
then his crime would be manslaughter. 
The unlawful act would fall short of as-
ately and unlawfully fired toward another sault with a deadly weapon, Penal Code, 
person in a manner 'likely to produce great § 245, or even assault, Penal Code, § 240 
bodily injury,' an ~ssault with a deadly if the jury chose to believe his testimony 
weapon may be accomplished even if the that he had no intent to kill or injure any-
Court appended in denying petition for " 
hearing); People v. Mendez (1924) 67 
Cal.App. 724, 228 P. 349; People v.' 
Lopez (1927) 81 Cal.Apll. 199, 253 P. 
169; People v. Lim Dum Dong (1938). 
26 Cal.App.2d 135, 78 P.2<1 1026; People 
v. Bumbaugh (1941). 48 Cal.App.2d 791, 
796, 120 P.2d 703; Pcoplev. Schmidt 
(1944) 66 Oal.App.2d 253, 256, 152 P.2d 
1021; People v. Peak (1944) 66 Cal. 
App.2d 894, 901, 153 P.2d 464; People 
v. Oorlett (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 33, 54-
55, 153 P.2d 595; People v. Duncan 
(1945) 72 Cal.App.2d 423, 164 P.2<1 510;· 
People v. Griffin (1949, Peters,J.) 90. 
Cul.App.2d 116, 1~0-121, 202I;'.2d 573:; 
People v. Ingram (1949) 91 CaI.ApI).2d 
912, 914,206 P.2d 36; People v. Thomp-
son (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 780, 209 P.2d 
819; People v. Walker (1950) 99 Cal. 
AllP.2d 238, 242, 221 P.2d· 287; People 
v. IJaya (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 7,. 15, 
266P.2d 157; Peopley. flwansb(jr{l 
(1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 831, 837, 19 Cp.l. 
Rptr. 527; People v. Finley (1963).219 
Cal.App.2d 330, 340, 33 Ca1.Rptr. 31; 
People v. Herd (1963) 220 CaI.App.2d·. 
847. 850,34 Cal.Rptr. 141; People v. 
Sandoval (1963) 222 Cal.App.2(1 348, 
351, 35 Cal.Rptr. 227; People v. CIa· 
born (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 38, 42, 36 
Ca];Rptr. 132; Newman v. Larson (1964, 
Burke, J.J. 225 Cal.App.2d 22, 24, 36 Cal. 
Rptr. 883; Peoplev. Gaines (1966) 247 
Ca1.App.2d HI, 148, 55 Cal.Rptr. 283; 
People v. Wright (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 
762, 766-767, 66 Cal.Rptr. 95; People v. 
Morrow (1969) 268 A.C.A. 1029, 1039-
1044, 74 Cal.RJltr. 551. Seli 4 Am.Jur., 
Assault and Battery, § 6, p. 130; 6 Am. 
Jur.2u Assault and Battery, §§ 13-20, 
pp. 21-24; Fricke, Cal.Oriminal Law 
(8th cd.) p. 186; 1 Witkin, CIlI.Crimes 
(1963) pp. 249-250. But, as to the pres-
ence of some confusion, compare 3 Cal. 
Jur., Assault and Battery, § 14, pp. 197-
198 with id., § 19, p. 203; and see 5 
CaI.Jur.2d, Assault and. Battery, § 4, pp. 
304-307; 92 A.L.R.2d. 635. At least one 
early case implies that assault requires 
the specific intent to injure. People v. 
Douel (1888) 77 Cal. 293, 294, 19 P. 
484. 
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One. This follows from the definition of 
an assault as 'an unlawful attempt, coupled 
with a present ability, to commit a violent 
injury on the person of another.' Penal 
Code, § 240; One could not very well 'at-
tempt' or try to 'commit' an injury on the 
person of another if he had no intent to 
cause any injury to such other person. 
Assault with a deadly weapon is nothing 
more than an assault where there is used 
either a deadly weapon or any means of 
force likely to produce 'great' bodily in-
jury. Penal Code, § 245. The crime here 
involved, if defendant's testimony is ac-
cepted as true, would seem to be a misde-
meanor. 'Every person who,' except in self-
defense, in the presence of any other per-
son, draws or exhibits any firearm, whether 
loaded or unloaded,. or any other deadly 
weapon whatsoever, in a rude, angry or 
threatening manner, or who in any manner, 
unlawfully uses the same in any fight or 
quarrel is guilty of a misdemeanor.' Penal 
Code, § 417." 
The opinion then expressly disapproved 
the cases that had held reckless conduct 
to be a sufficient basis for assault. (Peo-
ple v.Peak, supra, 66 Cal.App.2d 894, 153 
P.2d 464; People v. Corlett, supra, 67 Cal. 
App.2d 33, 153 P.2d 595; People v. Bum-
baugh, supra, 48 Ca1.App.2d 791, 120 P.2d 
703.) 
Carmen was followed in People v. Wil-
son (1967) 66 Ca1.2d 749, 759, 59 Cal.Rptr. 
156, 427 P.2d 820. Subsequently, in People 
v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 221-222, 60 
Ca1.Rptr. 457, 469, 430 P.2d 15, 27, we said, 
"[D] efendant testified at trial that he had 
no intention of harming or killing anyone 
and that he at no time aimed his gunshots 
at any person identifiable by him as such. 
It would seem clear that if defendant's tes-
timony on this point were believed by the 
jury, it could not properly find violations 
of section 217 Or section 245, subdivision 
(b), of the Penal Code, for basic to the 
indicated varieties of aggravated assault is 
the crime of simple assault. 'An assault is 
an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present 
ability, to commit a violent injury on the 
person of another.' (Pen.Code, § 240.) 
'One could not very well "attempt" or try 
to "commit" an injury on the person of 
another if he had no intent to cause any in-
jury to such other person. * * *' (Peo-
ple v. Carmen [citation omitted].) Even 
if the jury had been instructed as to sec-
tion 834a of the Penal Code, it is clear that 
a breach of the duty of submission [to ar~ 
rest] imposed by that section, absent any 
intent to cause injury to a police officer, 
could not result in aggravated assault of 
the varieties here charged." 
It should be noted that the opinion in 
Coffey did not tlSe the words "specific in-
tent," and that the opinion in Carmen, 
after the language quoted above, continued 
with the statement (p. 776, 228 P.2d p. 286) : 
"It is true that in assault cases intent need 
not be specific-to cause any particular 
injury and it may be implied from the act, 
People v. McCoy, 25 Ca1.2d 177, 153P.2d 
315, but the intent is a question for the 
jury." 
Carmen, Wilson, and Coffey have given 
rise to directly conflicting opinions in th~ 
coqrts of appeal. In People v. Fanning 
(1968) 265 Ca1.App.2d 729,734,71 Ca1.Rptr. 
641, 644, the court declared, "In spite of 
occasional statements to the contrary * *, 
we think it now settled that assault is a 
specific intent crime. * * *" (Citing 
People v. Carmen, People v. Coffey, and 
People v. Wilson, supra; People v. Wheeler 
(1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 522, 525, n. 4, 67 
Cal. Rptr. 240; People v. Corson (1963) 221 
Ca1.App.2d 579, 581, 34 Cal.Rptr. 584. See 
also, People v. Roshid (1961) 191 CaLApp. 
2d 692, 693-694, 12 Cal.Rptr. 794.) On the 
other hand, People v. Morrow, supra, 268 
A.C.A. 1029, 1044, 74 Ca1.Rptr. 551, 561, 
expressly rejected the Fanning conclusion 
and held that assault with a deadly weapon 
"does not require proof of a specific intent 
to harm the victim but relies upon the 
general rule that what was done by [de-
fendant] shows that harm was intended by 
the aggravated assault."· The Morrow 
court reviewed many of the earlier cases 
and decided that sttch an overwhelming line 
of authority could not be considered over-
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ruled merely by implication from Carmen, yet workable, doctrine.5 The theory that 
Wilson, and Coffey. these judges explored was that evidence of 
The distinction between specific and 
general intent crimes evolved as a judicial 
response to the problem of the intoxicated 
offender. That problem is to reconcile two 
competing theories of what is just in the 
treatment of those who commit crimes 
while intoxicated. On the one hand, the 
moral culpability of a drunken criminal is 
frequently less than that of a sober person 
effecting a like injury. On the other hand, 
it is' commonly felt that a person who voh11l~ 
tarily gets drunk and while in that state 
commits a crime should not escape the con~ 
sequences. (See Hall, General Principles 
of Criminal Law (2d ed. 1960), p. 537.) 
Before the nineteenth century, the com~ 
mon law refused to give any effect to the 
fact that an accused committed a crime 
while intoxicated. The judges were ap~ 
parently troubled by this rigid traditional 
rule, however, for there were a ntimber of 
attempts during the early part of the nine-
teenth century to arrive at a more humane, 
5. In 1819 Holroyd, J., held in a murder 
case that, while voluntary drunkenness 
could not be an excuse, it should be con-
sidered in determining the issue of pre-
meoitation. (Rex v. Grindley; quoted in 
Rex v. Carroll (1835) 7 C. & P. 14,5, 113 
Eng.Rep. 64.) In Hegina v. Cruse 
(1838) 8 C. & P. 541, 173 Eng.Hep. 6io; 
a case of assault with intent to murder, 
the court instrueted thc jury that gross 
intoxication might disprove the intcntion 
required for the aggravated offense. 
With respect to it similar charge in Re-
gina v. l\lonkhouse (1849) 4 Cox C.C. 55, 
Coleridge, J., said that the burden was 
on the accused to show that his intoxica-
tion prevented him from using self-re-
straint or took away from him ""the 
power of forming any specific intention." 
This opinion was apparently the first 
to use the words "specific intention." 
"As if by accident, the 'sjlecific inten· 
tion' was seized upon as the importnnt 
criterion. Yet the wording of Coleridge, 
J.'s summing-up shows that he did not 
mean to weave nny particular magic with 
these words. This is obvious when he 
directs the jury in ]J[ onkho1tSe to make 
'a proper assessment of both act and 
mind: 'To ascertain whether or not {the 
lack of power to form any specific in-
462 P.2d-241/, 
intoxication could be considered to negate 
intent, whenever intent was an element of 
the crime charged. As Professor Hall 
notes, however, such an exculpatory doc~ 
trine could eventually have undermined the 
traditional rule entirely, since some form of 
mens rea is a requisite of all but strict li~ 
ability offenses. (Hall, Intoxication and 
Criminal Responsibility, 57 Harv.L.Rev. 
1045, 1049.) To limit the operation of the 
doctrine and achieve a compromise between 
the conflicting feelings of sympathy and 
reprobation for the intoxicated offender, 
later courts both in England and this coun-
try drew a distinction between so-called 
specific intent and general intent crimes. 
Specific and general intent have been 
notoriously difficult terms to define and ap~ 
ply, and a number of textwriters recom~ 
mend that they be abandoned altogether. 
, (Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, 
supra, p. 142; Williams, Criminal Law-
The General Part (2d ed.1961) § 21, p. 49.) 
Too often the characterization of a partic~ 
tention] did exist in this instancc, you 
must take into consideration the quantity 
of spirit he hao taken, as well as his 
_'lJccific conduct.' Surely the adjective 
'sriecific' simply means that the accused's 
actions, men ttll processes and motives, 
that is, all the circumstances of the case, 
should be evaluated by the jury and view-
ed subjectively." (Beck and Parker, The 
Intoxicated Offend(lr-A Problem of Re-
sponsibility, 44 Can.Bar.Hev. 563, 578.) 
Subsequent English cases of the nine-
teenth century diu not stress Coleridge's 
phrase, but exploreu the general thesis 
that intoxication was relevant to the" 
issue of Intent. Thus, In Regina v. 
Bentley (1850) 14 J.P. 671, the court 
stated that "the question of drunkenness 
is a fact which, among otllers, the jury 
may take into consideration in endcavur-
iug to ascertain the intent." In a form 
morc akin to the present rule (Pen.Code, 
§ 22), Stephen, J., told the jury in R. 
v. Doherty (1887) 16 Cox C.C. 463, 
"when the crime is such that the inten-
tion of the party committing it is one of 
its constituent elements you may look at 
the fact that n mnn was in drink in COll-
sidering whether he formed the intention 
necessary to constitute the crime." 
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t!1ar crime as one of specific or general Even if we assume ,that the presence or 
intent is determined solely by the presence absence of words clearly denoting mental 
or absence of words describing psychologi- activity is a valid criterion for determining 
cal phenomena-"intent" or "malice," for the significance of intoxication, OUf present 
example-in the statutory language of de- problem is not resolved. The difficulty 
fining the crime. When the definition of a with applying such a test to the crime of 
crime consists of only the description of a assatllt or assault with a deadly weapon is, 
particular act, without reference to intent that no word in the relevant code: provisions 
to do a' further act or achieve a future con- unambiguollsly denotes a particular mental 
sequence, we ask whether the defendant in- element, yet the word "attempt" in Penal 
tended to do the proscribed act. This in- Code section 240 strongly suggests goal-di-
tention is deemed to be a general criminal rected, intentional behavior.6 This uncer-
intent. When the definition refers to de- tainty acc,ollrits'for tne to"rlfHct over wheth-
fendant's intent to do some further act or' er assalllt'is"a crime only of intention or 
achieve some additional consequence, the ; 'also' of recklessness. 
crime is deemed to be one of specific intent. 
There is no real di fference, however, only 
a linguistic one, between an intent to do 
an act already performed and an intent to 
do that same act in the future. 
The language of Penal Code section 22, 
drafted in 1872 when "specific" and "gen-
eral" intent were not yet terms of art, is 
somewhat broader than those terms: "No' 
act committed by a person while in a state 
of voluntary intoxication is less criminal 
by reason of his having been in such condi-
tion: But whenever the actual existence 
of any particula.r purpose, motive, or in-
tent is a necessary element to constitute 
any particular species or degree of crime, 
the jury may take into consideration the 
fact that the accused was intoxicated at 
the time, in determining the purpose, mo-
tive, or intent with which he committed the 
act." , Even this statement of the relevant 
policy is no easier to apply to particular 
crimes. We are still confronted with the 
difficulty of characterizing the mental ele-
ment of a given crime as a particular pur-
pose, motive, or intent necessary to consti-
tute the offense, or as something less than 
that to which evidence of intoxication is 
not pertinent. 
6. Pen.Code § 240 lltovi(1cS: "An assault 
is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a 
present ability, to commit a violent in-
jury on the person of 1Inother." 
It was the strong suggestion of intent in 
the ordinary usage of the word "attempt" 
that was at the basis of this eourt's 
,We need ~ot reconsider our posltLOn in 
Carmen that an assault cannot be predicated 
merely on' reckless conduct. Even if as-
sault requires an intent to commit a battery 
on the victim, iidoeS not follow that the 
crime is one in which evidence of intoxi-
cation ought,to be considered in determin-
ing whether the defendant had that intent. 
It is true that in most cases specific intent 
:has come to mean an intention to do a 
future act or achieve a particular result, 
and that assault is appropriately charac-
terj;,;~d as a specific intent crime tinder 
this definition. An assault, however, is 
equally, well characterized as a general in-
tent crfme under the definition of general 
intent cas an intent merely to do a violent 
act. Therefore, whatever reality the dis~ 
tin'ction between specific and general intent 
ma'y have in other contexts, the difference 
is 'chimerical in the case of assault with a 
deadly weapOn or simple assault. ' Since 
the definitions of both specific intent and 
general intent cover the requisite intent to 
commit a battery, the decision whether or 
not to "give effect to evidence of intoxica-
tion mu'st rest on other considerations. 
A compelling consideration is the effect 
of alcohol on human behavior. A signifi-
remark in People ..J.' Carmen, 36 CaL2!l 
701l, 775, 228 1'.2<1 281, 286, that "{o]ne 
could not very well 'attempt' or try to 
'commit' an injury on the person of 
another jf he had no intent to cause any 
injury to such other person." 
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cant effect of alcohol is to distort judgment [4] Those crimes that have traditionally 
and relax the controls on aggressive and been characterized as crimes of specific in-
anti-social impulses. (Beck and Parker, tent are not affected by our holding here. 
The Intoxicated Offender-A Problem of The difference in mental activity between 
Responsibility (1966), 44 Can.B.Rev. 563, formulating an intent to commit a battery 
570-573; Mllelberger, Medico-Legal As- and formulating an intent to commit a bat-
pects of Alcohol Intoxication (1956), 35 tery for the purpose of raping or killing 
may be slight, but it is sufficient to justify Mich.st.B.J. 36, 40-41.) Alcohol apparent- drawing a line between them and consider-
ly has less effect on the ability to engage in ing evidence of intoxication in the one 
simple goal-directed behavior, although it case and disregarding it in the other." 
may impair the efficiency of that behavior. Accordingly, on retrial the court should 
In other words, a 9,ru1)~ man is capable of not instruct the jury to consider evidence 
forming an intent to do something simple, of defendant's intoxication in determining 
such as strike another, unless he is so drunk whether he committed assault with a deadly 
that he has reached the stage of uncon- weapon on a peace officer or any of the 
sciousness. What he is not as capable as lesser assaults included therein. ,People v. 
a sober man of doing is exercising judg- Fanning, supra, 265 Cal.App.2d 729, 71 
ment about the social consequences of his Cal. Rptr. 641, and any case implying the 
acts or controlling his impulses toward anti-
social acts. He is more likely to act rashly 
and impulsively and to be susceptible to pas-
sion and anger. It would therefore be 
anomalous to allow evidence of intoxication 
to relieve a man of responsibility for the 
crimes of assault with a deadly weapon or 
simple assault, which are so frequently com-
mitted in just such a manner. As the court 
said in Parker v. United States (1966) 123 
U.S.App.D.C. 343, 359 F.2d 1009, 1012-1013, 
"Whatever ambiguities there' may, be in 
distinguishing between specific and general 
intent to determine whether drunkenness 
constitutes a defense, an offense of this 
nature is not one which requires an intent 
that is susceptible to negation throligh a 
showing of voluntary intoxication." 
7. It should be pointed out that the fact 
that intent may be inferred from the 
defendant's conduct does' not' affect the 
nature of the requisite intent. Whether 
the intent be merely to do that which was 
done or to do a further act or achieve 
a particular cOnsequence, thc jury may in-
fer from defendant's rl'cts that defendant 
acted with the requisite intent, if such 
an inference is warrnnted by the evidence. 
As the Court of Appeal said in People 
v. J)'anning, supra, 265 Cal.Apll.2d 729, 
734 n. 4, 71 Cal.Itptr.641, 044, in dis-
cussing whether assault was a specific 
or a general intent crime, "The confusion 
contrary are disapproved. 
To preclude double' punishment for a 
single assault (Pen.Code,§ 654), the trial 
court stayed execution of the sentence on 
Count I, which carries a maximum penalty 
of 15 years (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)), 
and ordered that defendant serve' the sen-
tence on Count III, which carries a maxi-
mum penalty of 14 years (Pen.Code, § 
217). Accordingly, had defendant not ap-
pealed, his maximum. term would have been 
14 years. To preclude penalizing him for 
appealing, the court may not impose a 
maximum sentence of more than 14 years if 
on retrial he is again found guilty on Connt 
I or Count III or both. (People v. Hender-
son (1963) 60 Ca1.2d 482, 495-497, 35 
Cal.Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d 677; People v. Ali 
(1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281-282, 57 Ca1.Rptr. 
seems to 'be, in part at least, traceable 
to the rule that the intent may' be in-
ferred from the act.' (People v. l\IcCoy, 
25 Ca1.2d 177, 194-195, 153 P.2d 315.) 
The fact thnt one clement of It crime may 
be inferred from proof of another does 
not decrease the number of clements." 
In the crimes of simple' assault and as-, 
sault with a deadly.weapon, the jury may 
infer from defendant's conduct that he' 
entertained the necessary intent to com-
mit an injury, Such an inference does 
not affect the nature of that intent or 
determine what significance should be 
accorded to evidence of intoxication. 
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348,424 P.2d 932; In re Ferguson (1965) 
233 Cal.App.2d 79, 81-82, 43 Cal.Rptr. 325.) 
The judgment is reversed. 
McCOMB, PETERS, TOBRINER, 
MOSK, BURKE, and SULLIVAN, JJ., 
concur. 
82 Cal.Rptr. 628 
In re Tony Montoya LARA 
on Habeas Corpus. 
Cr. 13743. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Dec. 23, 1969. 
Petitioner, who had been convicted of 
murder and had been given death penalty, 
brought habeas corpus proceeding in Su-
preme Court. The Supreme Court, Mosk, 
J., held that where, in murder prosecution 
in which death penalty was imposed, prose-
cuting attorney asked each prospective ju-
ror whether he or she could impose death 
penalty il} a proper case, and, at conclusion 
of examination, prosecuting attorney suc-
cessfully challenged each prospective juror 
who answered in negative a n~w penalty 
trial was required. 
Writ granted as to penalty trial, remit-
titur issued in murder prosecution recalled, 
judgment imposing death penalty reversed 
insofar as it related to penalty, and, in all 
other respects, judgment affirmed. 
Burke and McComb, n., dissented in 
part.. 
I. Criminal Law €=o1186(4) 
Where California Supreme Court pre-
viously recognized that admission of those 
portions of codefendant's confession, which 
implicated defendant, constituted error in 
murder prosecution in state court under 
California decision, and thereafter United 
States Supreme Court adopted that deci-
sion as constitutionally compelled by con-
frontation clause of Sixth Amendment and 
declared the decision to be fully retroac-
tive, effect of such error was then required 
to be judged by federal harmless error 
standard rather than by California harm-
less error standard by California courts. 
West's Ann.Cal.Const. art. 6, § 13; U.S.C. 
A. Canst. Amend. 6. 
2. Criminal Law €=o1169(12) 
Where effect of'i-.ny. circumstances 
which might otherwise have mitigated im-
pact of confession of defendant was over-
come by portions of statement of codefen-
dant implicating defendant, the implication 
will be prejudicial to defendant despite de-
fendant's confession, and such situation 
may occur when confessing defendant 
presents evidence to show that his confes-
sion was not freely given, and he also de-
nied its truth on the witness stand. West's 
Ann.Cal.Const. art. 6, § 13; U.S.C.A.Const. 
Amend. 6. 
3. Criminal Law €=ol 169(12) 
Error in admitting portions of confes-
sion of codefendant implicating defendant 
in murder prosecution was not prejudicial 
error, where codefendant's confession was 
not only evidence placing defendant at 
scene of murder, and defendant's own con-
fession -sltpplied that fact very convincing-
ly, and both girl friend and sister of de-
fendant testified to spontaneous, unsolicit-
ed confessions defendant made to them 
shortly after murder. West's Ann.Cal. 
Canst art. 6, § 13; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 
6. 
4. Courts €=oIOO(I)· 
While United States Supreme Court 
decided that warrantless searches incident 
to arrest were not unreasonable within 
meaning of Fourth Amendment, and Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decided that United 
States decision was prospective in opera-
tion, special exception would not be carved 
out in capital cases to apply the United 
States Supreme Court decision retroactive-
ly when death penalty was decreed. U.S. 
C.A.Const. Amend. 4. 
